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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1933 
___________ 
 
DAVID STRICKENGLOSS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE CORRECTION INSTITUTION AT MERCER; DOCTOR MORGAN; P.A. 
HORNEMAN; THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT SCI MERCER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-00361) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 19, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Strickengloss, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional 
Institution at Mercer (“SCI-Mercer”) in Pennsylvania, appeals pro se the District Court’s 
2 
 
entry of summary judgment in a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   For 
the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.  See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.     
In his complaint, Strickengloss alleged that the defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Strickengloss alleged that a fall on February 26, 2012 caused a serious injury to his back 
and knee, and that the defendants’ treatment, or lack of treatment, constituted a 
constitutional violation.  The defendants raised the affirmative defense of failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, and the District court granted summary judgment in 
their favor on that basis.        
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo an award of 
summary judgment, “applying the same test that the District Court should have applied 
and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”   Schneyder v. 
Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2011).  A motion for summary judgment should be 
granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner is required to exhaust 
his administrative remedies prior to filing suit under § 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 
Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).  Proper exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to bringing suit is mandatory.  See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-
41 (2001); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2006).   
 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy Statement No. DC-ADM 804-1 
sets out the administrative grievance process for state correctional facilities.  It includes 
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three levels: an initial, formal grievance; an appeal to the superintendent; and a final level 
appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA).  See 
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing Pennsylvania’s 
prison grievance system).  The undisputed factual record indicates that Strickengloss did 
not present his claim at each level prior to filing suit.   
Strickengloss filed an administrative grievance which was denied on March 2, 
2012.  Strickengloss alleged that he filed a timely appeal to the superintendent on March 
7, 2012.
1
  Assuming that he did, Strickengloss had 15 days from the date of the 
superintendent’s response to file an appeal to SOIGA.  Strickengloss filed the instant 
action on March 20, 2012.  Strickengloss claimed he never received a response from the 
superintendent, and so he filed an appeal to SOIGA some eight months later, well after 
commencing this action.  Assuming that all of Strickengloss’s allegations are true, by his 
own admission he did not properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.  
See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S 199, 204 (2007).  Assuming, as Strickengloss alleged, 
that the prison never responded to his appeal to the superintendent, he could not have 
                                              
1
In an appendix in support of his response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss, 
Strickengloss attached a document purporting to be a timely filed appeal of his grievance, 
dated March 5, 2012.  Strickengloss attached a different document purporting to be a 
timely filed appeal to the superintendent in his 102-pages of objections to the Magistrate 
Judge’s report and recommendation.  The second purported appeal is dated March 7, 
2012, but has a stamp reading August 21, 2012.  The document itself alleged that he 
attempted to mail another appeal to the superintendent on March 2 or 3.  We note that 
Strickengloss’s original form complaint, dated March 20, 2012, specifically asks 
prisoners what steps were taken to appeal an administrative grievance, and Strickengloss 
made no mention of any administrative appeal on March 3, 5, or 7.  The defendants first 
raised the issue of failure to properly exhaust in motions to dismiss filed on July 9 and 10 
of 2012, and the defendants alleged that no appeal to the superintendent was filed.  
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known there would be no response by the time he filed this action.  As the Supreme Court 
has noted, the PLRA demands that a prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies before 
filing suit.  See id.  Strickengloss did not do so.  He therefore procedurally defaulted his 
claim.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004).   
Finding no substantial question to be presented by this appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Strickengloss’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied. 
